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1 Introduction
The 2008 world nancial crisis saw most European countries in a vulnerable scal position with
high decits and debts as a share of GDP, above the 3% and 60% of the Stability and Growth
Pact limits.1 As a result several European governments have been forced to take restrictive scal
actions, the so called scal consolidation.
By now most studies nd that scal consolidation entails an intertemporal trade-o¤ for the
main macroeconomic aggregates, see e.g. Coenen et al. (2008), Schwarzmüller and Wolters
(2014), Philippopoulos et al. (2015) and (2017a). That is the early phase of scal consolidation
requires cuts in spending and/or rises in taxes.2 This is the short run scal pain. In the
long run, once debt reduction has been achieved, the resulting scal space can be utilized to
increase spending and/or reduce distortionary taxes. This is the long run scal gain. However,
scal consolidation also has important distributional implications. For example, Furceri et al.
(2015) nd that during scal consolidation periods the lowest income and wealth quantiles of
the population became worse o¤ in terms of their disposable income.
The aim of this paper is to study the distributional and aggregate implications of scal
consolidation policy. Since the aggregate e¤ects have been thoroughly studied, our primary
focus will be on the distributional e¤ects. In particular, we examine the intertemporal e¤ects
of scal consolidation on the distribution of wages and income, whether this reform generates
an equity e¢ ciency trade o¤, and if yes, whether the magnitude of this trade o¤ varies over
di¤erent time horizons (i.e. short, medium and long run). Furthermore, we examine whether
any distributional implications depend on the scal policy mix, on the source of heterogeneity
incorporated in the model and the measure of inequality under consideration.
To study this, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous house-
holds calibrated to the Euro Area over the period 2001-2015. The model includes two types
of households, capital-skill complementarity in the production function in the spirit of Krusell
et al. (2000) and endogenous human capital accumulation. Households di¤er in the type of
labor they supply and their access to capital and nancial markets.3 In a standard model with
representative Ricardian households, each agent can smooth out exogenous scal policy changes,
1There is by now a tendency of declining public decits in the Euro Area. This is reected not only in statistical
indicators but also in the number of countries that are still under the Excessive Decit Procedure (EDP). The
structural decit in the EU was reduced markedly from 4.3 % to 1.0 % in the Euro Area. At the country level, in
2010 only ve Member States recorded long run decits below the 3% of GDP reference threshold, while, 22 did
so in 2014. See European Commission (2017).
2 In addition, consolidation e¤orts usually come at the expense of growth-friendly spending items such as
spending on public investment and education which further harms the prospects of long term growth see European
Central Bank (2017) for a discussion on the trade-o¤s between scal consolidation and reforms.
3There are di¤erent ways to introduce heterogeneous agents in DSGE models. For instance, Gali et al. (2007),
Forni et al. (2009), Coenen et al. (2013), Schwarzmüller and Wolters (2017) use models in which a share of
households does not have access to nancial or/and capital markets (Ricardian vs Non-Ricardian). Households
can also exhibit heterogeneity in terms of their impatience (patient vs impatient) as in Bilbiie et al. (2013), their
labor market status (public vs private sector workers) as in Ardagna (2007) and Economides et al. (2012) or with
respect to their education and skills as in Angelopoulos et al. (2014), Angelopoulos et al. (2017) and Gomes
(2018).
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like scal consolidation, through borrowing or lending. In addition, all households rely on the
same sources of income, while, their labor and capital incomes are identical. Thus, there is no
room for distributional analysis. To capture distributional implications, we depart from this
framework and allow for non-uniform distributions of asset holdings and skills.
In particular, households that save in the form of government bonds, own physical capital
and rms and supply skilled labor services are referred to as Rich. On the other hand, households
that do not have access to nancial and capital markets, i.e. they live hand-to-mouth, and supply
unskilled labor services are referred to as Poor. In line with empirical evidence we assume that
the asset and skill distributions are positively related. The heterogeneity in the skill supply of
labor force gives rise to the so called skill premium which is the measure of wage inequality in
our setup. The skill premium implies that Rich households receive relatively higher wages than
Poor households. Finally, both households can invest time in education and accumulate human
capital.
Regarding policy, government has a rather rich set of spending and tax instruments at
its disposal. Particularly, government levies consumption, labor and capital taxes to nance
productivity-enhancing spending like public investment and spending on education, utility-
enhancing expenditures like government consumption, as well as transfer payments targeted
to Rich and Poor households.
Our main policy experiment is scal consolidation. That is the economy starts from a steady
state with high debt-to-GDP ratio, say 85.3%, which is the EA-19 data average over the scal
stress period 2008-2014, and travels towards a new reformed steady state with lower debt-to-GDP
ratio, say 60%. We experiment with various reformed economies varying the scal instrument
which reaps the benet of scal space after debt consolidation. Government can achieve the
transition from the status quo to the new reformed steady state by implementing alternative
scal consolidation policy mixes. Following most of the literature on debt consolidation we
follow a rule-based approach to policy. In addition, we focus on constrained optimized scal
policy rules so as our results do not depend on ad hoc di¤erences in feedback policy coe¢ cients.
To do this, we follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004, 2007) so that we limit our attention to a
family of simple scal rules. This means that all the scal instruments can respond to the gap
between public debt and the target of public debt as shares of output.
The structure of our model enables us to assess aggregate and distributional e¤ects of scal
consolidation in the long run and along the transition. To do this, we utilize the key endogenous
variables of the model. For example, to quantify aggregate e¤ects, we employ variables such
as output and social welfare, while, to measure distributional e¤ects, we nd it natural to use
variables like the net income of Rich and Poor households, inequality in net incomes and wages,4
4The reason that we employ these two di¤erent measures of inequality is the following. The vehicle of our
analysis is the household budget constraint, which is the most straightforward way to understand how the di¤erent
dimensions of inequality are linked with endogenous choices, e.g. labor supply and saving decisions, access to
nancial markets and scal policy changes. For a systematic and comprehensive analysis see Krueger et. al.
(2010) and Heathcote et. al. (2010).
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household specic welfare as well as relative welfare.
Our main results are as follows. In the long run, scal consolidation always enhances both
e¢ ciency and equity. Thus, once debt reduction has been achieved and scal space has been
created, output increases, while, both wage and income inequality decrease. Looking at welfare,
in contrast, scal consolidation is not always Pareto e¢ cient. For example, such reform can
be harmful for Rich households when government uses the post consolidation scal space to
increase non productive government consumption or transfers targeted to Poor households. On
the other hand, we nd that scal consolidation is Pareto e¢ cient, i.e. both Rich and Poor
households get better o¤ in the reformed steady state, when the government uses the resulting
scal space to nance an increase in spending on public education and/or to nance a cut in
distortionary taxation.
Along the transition, the government should cut non productive government consumption to
reduce debt to its new lower target, while, keeping all the remaining scal instruments constant
at their historical averages. This induces a temporary output contraction, however due to the
crowding in e¤ects, aggregate output quickly recovers above its pre consolidation level. Thus
scal consolidation is costly on impact but e¢ cient in the medium/long run.
On the other hand, the di¤erent driving forces of inequality in the model lead to interesting
distributional implications that may di¤er across the various measures of inequality. In a nut-
shell, the skill premium increases, while, income inequality decreases. In terms of welfare, scal
consolidation hurts only Poor households in the short run, while, it benets Rich households.
More specically, wage inequality signicantly increases in the short/medium run due to the
capital skill complementarity structure of the production function. The logic is the following,
scal consolidation results in an increase in the physical capital stock and a reduction in relative
skill supply which drive upward the wages of Rich households and increases the gap with the
wage of Poor households in the short run.
However, income inequality decreases due to the asset heterogeneity between Rich and Poor
households. Since scal consolidation induces a sharp reduction in government bonds and real
rates, Rich households, who own assets and capital, see a decrease in their income coming from
government bonds and capital. The latter leads to the deterioration in Rich householdstotal
net income vis-à-vis Poor householdstotal net income despite the opposite movement in their
wages and labor incomes.
A rather novel nding of this paper is that the combination of asset and skill heterogeneity
amplies the increase in wage inequality in the early phase of scal consolidation. Poor house-
holds rely only on labor income since they do not own assets and capital. Thus, in the transition
phase of consolidation, they need to increase their labor supply to compensate the loss in their
labor income due to the reduction in their wages. The increase in their hours worked pushes
further downward Poor householdswages, and thus, widens the inequality with respect to Rich
householdswages. Finally, in terms of welfare, scal consolidation is not Pareto e¢ cient in the
short run. Although it seems to enhance social welfare, this increase arises solely from welfare
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gains accruing to Rich households, while the welfare of Poor households decreases.
This paper contributes to the vast literature on scal consolidation by focusing mainly on
its distributional implications. First, this paper is closely related to papers that study the
aggregate and distributional implications of scal consolidation in dynamic general equilibrium
models under ad hoc policy, e.g. Coenen et al. (2008), Economides et al. (2012), Almeida et al.
(2013), Schwarzmüller and Wolters (2017) and Roubanis (2018).5 Second, our work is related to
papers that compute optimal scal consolidation policies in DSGE models, e.g. Bi and Kumhof
(2011), Cantore et al. (2012), Philippopoulos et al. (2015), (2017a) and (2017b) and Cardani
et al. (2018). Third, our work is also related to papers that study other types of scal policy
reforms in dynamic general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents, like Garcia-Mila et
al. (2010), Angelopoulos et al. (2013), Angelopoulos et al. (2014), Angelopoulos et al. (2017),
Gomes (2018), Michaud and Rothert (2018), however, they do not focus on the distributional
e¤ects of scal consolidation.
In this paper, we employ a joint heterogeneity setup including asset and skill heterogeneity6
to assess scal consolidation. Moreover, we compute constrained optimized scal policy rules
for a rich set of (utility- and productivity-enhancing) spending and tax instruments. Thus,
we provide a systematic framework to assess the distributional implications, along with the
aggregate e¤ects, of scal consolidation policy.
The structure of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and solves
for the decentralized competitive equilibrium. Section 3 develops our calibration strategy and
solves for the status quo steady state solution. Section 4 describes the main policy experiment,
while, Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 analyzes the underlying transmission mechanism
and Section 7 conducts sensitivity analysis. Section 8 concludes the paper. Algebraic details
and additional results are in an Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Informal description of the model
We develop a closed economy dynamic general equilibrium model which consists of households,
rms and a government. The key feature of the model is household heterogeneity. Households
di¤er in two aspects. First, in the type of labor they supply and second in their access to nancial
and capital markets. Thus we incorporate ex ante skill and wealth heterogeneity. In particular
households that have access to capital and nancial markets, supply skilled labor services and
own private rms are referred to as Rich. Households that do not participate in capital and
nancial markets and supply unskilled labor services, thus, only consume their after-tax labor
5On the other hand, Forni et al. (2010), Cogan et al. (2013), Erceg and Lindé (2013), Pappa et al. (2015) and
Economides et al. (2017) focus on the aggregate implications of debt consolidation under ad hoc policy.
6See e.g. He and Liu (2008) and Angelopoulos et al. (2014) and the references therein on the interaction
among various scal policy reforms and distribution.
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income referred to as Poor.7 In addition, both household types can accumulate human capital
using a human capital production function à la Lucas while they derive utility from public
consumption.
On the production side, rms use physical and public capital, skilled and unskilled labor in
order to produce an homogeneous good. In the production sector we incorporate a nested CES-
Cobb Douglas production function similar to Krusell et al. (2000) which exhibits capital-skill
complementarity. As is known, this feature gives rise to the so called skill premium.
The government has a rather rich set of scal policy instruments at its disposal. In partic-
ular, it issues public debt and levies consumption, labor and capital income taxes to nance its
stream of public expenditures, namely spending on public education and investment, govern-
ment consumption and transfer payments which are allowed to be allocated unevenly between
households. Finally, we assume that all agents have perfect foresight.
2.2 Population composition
The population size, N; is exogenous and constant. It is comprised by two types of households,
i.e. Rich households indexed by the subscript R = 1; 2; : : : ; NR and Poor households indexed by
the subscript P = 1; 2; : : : ; NP where NR > NP and NP +NR = N is the total size. No mobility
or occupational change is possible between the two types. There are also f = 1; 2; : : : ; Nf rms.
For notational convenience, we assume also that Nf = NR.8
2.3 Rich households
Each Rich household, R, maximizes its discounted lifetime utility given by:
VR;0 
1X
t=0
tUR;t (cR;t; zR;t; g
c
t ) (1)
where cR;t and zR;t are consumption and leisure of each household, gct is per capita utility-
enhancing government consumption9 and 0 <  < 1 is the discount rate. The period utility
function UR;t (.) is increasing and strictly concave in all its arguments. For our numerical solu-
tions the period utility function is given by:
UR;t (cR;t; zR;t; g
c
t ) = 1log (cR;t + g
c
t ) + 2log (1  eR;t   lR;t) (2)
where 1; 2 are preference parameters,  measures the degree of substitutability between private
and public consumption, e.g. if  > 0 (< 0) private and public consumption are substitutes
7We follow Michaud and Rothert (2018) by referring to the two types of households as Rich and Poor.
8Following the related literature, e.g. Angelopoulos et al. (2014) and Michaud and Rothert (2018), we work
with a discrete number for population and its segments. We report that our results do not depend on this
assumption.
9Notice that gct  G
c
t
N
where Gct is aggregate utility-enhancing government consumption.
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(complements). Households are endowed with a normalized time unit:
zR;t + eR;t + lR;t = 1 (3)
where lR;t and eR;t is time devoted to labor and education respectively. The within period
budget constraint of each Rich household, R, is:
(1 +  ct) cR;t + iR;t + dR;t = (1  kt ) (rtkR;t + R;t) + (1   lt)wR;tlR;thR;t + trR;t + rbtbR;t (4)
where iR;t, is private investment in physical capital, kR;t, the beginning of period physical capital,
bR;t, the beginning of period government bonds whose gross returns are rt and rbt respectively,
hR;t, is the beginning of period human capital, dR;t, is savings in the form of government bonds,
R;t is dividends received from private rms, wR;t is the wage rate earned by Rich households,
trR;t  TRR;tNR is public transfers to each Rich household and 0 < kt ;  lt;  ct < 1, are tax rates on
capital income, labor income and consumption respectively. Rich households supply skilled labor
services while Poor households supply unskilled labor services to rms. Thus, Rich households
receive a relatively higher wage wR;t > wP;t than Poor households (for more details see section
2.6).10 To allow for productive education expenditures we use a human capital production
function as in Lucas (1988) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1997).11 Therefore, individual human
capital is augmented by time spent in education, eR;t, and by public spending on education,
geR;t  !get , which is a xed share ! of per capita public spending on education, get .12 The law
of motion of human capital of Rich household, R, is:
hR;t+1 = (1  h)hR;t +BR
h
(eR;t)
  geR;t1 ixR (5)
where BR > 0,  2 (0; 1), xR < 1 are productivity parameters, and h is the depreciation rate
of human capital. Following He and Liu (2008), xR < 1, captures decreasing returns to scale in
the production of new human capital. The laws of motion of physical capital and government
bonds for each R are:
kR;t+1 = (1  k)kR;t + iR;t (6)
bR;t+1 = bR;t + dR;t (7)
Each Rich household in any given period t, chooses cR;t; eR;t; lR;t; kR;t+1, bR;t+1 and hR;t+1
to maximize its lifetime utility subject to the constraints (4) (in which we incorporate (6) and
10Throughout the rest of the paper labor provided by Rich households referred to as skilled labor and labor
provided by Poor households referred to as unskilled labor. As we explain in section 3.1 there is adequate empirical
evidence associating wealth with skills.
11Alternatively, Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) use a learning by doing specication by including hours of work
and education as inputs. On the contrary, in our model, as in Daniel and Gao (2015), we allow for a production
function that combines a time input and a good input so as to assess the e¤ects of public education spending as
an additional productivity enhancing scal instrument.
12Similarly, get  G
e
t
N
where Get is total public spending on education.
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(7)) and (5) taking factor prices and policy as given. Dening as R;t and  R;t the Lagrange
multipliers associated with (4) and (5) respectively. The rst-order conditions are given in
Appendix A.1.
2.4 Poor households
Each Poor household, P , maximizes its expected discounted lifetime utility given by:
VP;0 
1X
t=0
tUP;t (cP;t; zP;t; g
c
t ) (8)
The period utility function UP;t (.) is increasing and strictly concave in all its arguments where
we use the same functional form for preferences and the same normalized time unit as above.13
The within period budget constraint of each Poor household is given by:
(1 +  ct) cP;t = (1   lt)wP;tlP;thP;t + trP;t (9)
where wP;t is the wage rate received by Poor households, trP;t  TRP;tNP is public transfers to
each Poor household. Contrary to Rich households, Poor households do not have access to
nancial and capital markets thus the only source of income is the labor income.14 In addition
they supply unskilled labor, and thus receive lower wages than Rich households. As before, the
law motion of human capital of each household of type, P , is:
hP;t+1 = (1  h)hP;t +BP
h
(eP;t)
  geP;t1 ixP (10)
where geP;t  (1  !) get is the amount of total public spending on education services enjoyed
by each P .15 Each Poor household, P , maximizes its lifetime utility in any given period t by
choosing cP;t; eP;t; lP;t; and hP;t+1 subject to the constraints (9) and (10) taking factor prices
and policy as given. Dening as P;t and  P;t the Lagrange multipliers associated with (9) and
(10) respectively. The rst-order conditions are given in Appendix A.2.
2.5 Firms
There are f = 1; 2 : : : ; Nf identical rms owned by the Rich households. Each rm, f , acts
competitively taking prices as given. Firms objective is to maximize their prots:
ft  yft   rtkft   wR;tlfR;t   wP;tlfP;t (11)
13Notation and functional forms of Poor households are analogous to Rich households.
14 In section 7.2 we relax this assumption.
15This is meant to be not only formal education (i.e. secondary or tertiary education spending), but could
resemble other types of educational programmes such as vocational training, on-the-job learning, continuing
professional development programmes among others. This type of investment is of special importance for the less
skilled or less wealthy members in the society since it increases their productivity and labor earnings.
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where yft is rm f
0s output. Firms utilize four factors inputs to produce an homogeneous good,
i.e. physical capital, kft , skilled labor services rented from Rich households, l
f
R;t, unskilled labor
services rented from Poor households, lfP;t, and per capita public capital, k
g
t . Production is given
by the following constant returns to scale (CRS) and constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
function similar to Krusell et al. (2000):
yft = A

m

lfP;t

+ (1 m)



kft
v
+ (1  )

lfR;t
vv 
(kgt )
1  (12)
where A > 0 is scale parameter, 0 < ; ;m < 1 are factor inputs share parameters and ; v  1
are parameters governing factor elasticities (see below for more details). Each rm f maximizes
its prots (11) subject to its production function (12) by choosing kft , l
f
R;t, l
f
P;t. First order
conditions are given in Appendix A.3.
2.6 Skill premium
In our setup the skill premium is dened as the ratio of the wage rate earned by the Rich
household over the wage rate earned by the Poor household. Combining the rst order conditions
with respect to lfR;t and l
f
P;t in the Appendix A.3 gives the following condition for the skill
premium:
wR;t
wP;t
= (1  ) 1 m
m
 
lfP;t
lfR;t
!1  "

 
kft
lfR;t
!
+ (1  )
#

 1
(13)
The di¤erent roles in the production function for skilled (Rich) and unskilled (Poor) labor
give rise to the so called skill premium meaning that wRwP > 1. In section 3.1 we calibrate the
associated parameters in the production function so that the implied factor input elasticities
and the resulting skill premium are in line with empirical studies. The elasticities of substitu-
tion between physical capital and skilled labor and between skilled and unskilled labor is 11 
whereas the elasticity between capital and skilled labor is 11 v . This formulation implies that
as long as  > v the production function exhibits capital-skill complementarity. Moreover, this
specication implies that the skill premium will be ceteris paribus increasing in physical capital
to skilled labor ratio,
kfR;t
lfR;t
(known as the capital-skill complementarity e¤ect) and decreasing
in the skilled to unskilled labor ratio,
lfR;t
lfP;t
(known as the relative skill supply e¤ect). For more
details see in Lindquist (2004) and Dolado et al. (2018).16
16Notice that
@

wR
wP

@
 
k
f
R
l
f
R
! > 0 as long as  > v and 0 < ; m < 1 while @

wR
wP

@
 
l
f
R
l
f
P
! < 0 as long as  < 1 and 0 < ;
m < 1:
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2.7 Government
The within-period government budget constraint is given by (in aggregate terms):
Gct +G
i
t +G
e
t + TRR;t + TRP;t + (1 + r
b
t )Bt = Bt+1 + Tt (14)
where Gct is total public spending on utility-enhancing government consumption, G
i
t is total
spending on public investment Get is total public spending on education, TRR;t and TRP;t are
respectively transfers to Rich and Poor households, Bt  NRbR;t denotes the beginning-of-period
stock of government bonds, and Tt denotes total tax revenues dened as:
Tt   ct (NRcR;t + nP cP;t) + ktNR (rtkR;t + R;t) +  lt (NPwP;tlP;thP;t +NRwR;tlR;thR;t) (15)
Each period t government sets eight scal instruments, i.e. ve public spending instruments,
namely utility-enhancing spending, public education, public investment and agent specic trans-
fers to Rich and Poor households and three tax instruments, namely capital, labor and con-
sumption taxes. We assume, unless otherwise stated, that the residual policy instrument is
public debt. The law motion of aggregate public capital is given by:
Kgt+1 = (1  g)Kgt +Git (16)
For notational convenience, in what follows, we use per capita quantities denoted with small
case letters for example, kgt  K
g
t
N ; while we dene spending instruments in terms of their output
shares, i.e. sg
i
t  G
i
t
Nfyft
=
Ngit
Nfyft
, sg
e
t  G
e
t
Nfyft
=
Nget
Nfyft
, sg
c
t  G
c
t
Nfyft
=
Ngct
Nfyft
, strPt  TRP;tNfyft =
NRtrP;t
Nfyft
,
strRt  TRR;tNfyft =
NRtrR;t
Nfyft
and total tax revenues in per capita terms,  t  TtN : Also, we express
the number of Rich, Poor households and rms in terms of their total population share, i.e.
nR  NRN , nP  NPN = 1  nR, nf  N
f
N = nR respectively.
2.8 Fiscal policy rules
Fiscal policy sets its spending-tax instruments following simple scal policy rules. In particular,
we allow all the main policy instruments t = fsg
c
t ; s
gi
t ; s
ge
t ; s
trP
t ; s
trR
t ; 
c
t ; 
l
t; 
k
t g to react to the
public debt to GDP ratio, qt 1  nRbtnfyt 1 , as deviation from a target according to a simple linear
rule:
t    = q (qt 1   q) (17)
where ; q denote scal policy targets and q are feedback policy coe¢ cients. If t is a
spending instrument then, q 6 0, and q > 0 if t is a tax instrument (see equations (60)-(67)
in Appendix).
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2.9 Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE)
DCE is dened as a sequence of allocations, prices and policies such that: (i) both household
types maximize their lifetime welfare, (ii) rms maximize their prots, (iii) goods, capital, labor,
dividends and bond markets clear, (iv) all constraints are satised, (v) policymakers follow scal
rules in Section 2.8.
We end up with a non-linear dynamic equilibrium system summarized by 39 equations in 39
unknowns {yft ; cR;t; cP;t; iR;t; dr;t; kR;t+1; hR;t+1; hP;t+1; bR;t+1; eR;t; eP;t; lR;t; lP;t, r
b
t ; R;t; R;t;
P;t;  R;t;  P;t; k
g
t ; rt, wR;t; wP;t; qt, g
c
t ; g
i
t; g
e
t ; trR;t; trP;t; g
e
R;t; g
e
P;t; s
gi
t ; s
gc
t ; s
ge
t ; s
trP
t ; s
trR
t ; 
c
t ;
 lt; 
k
t }. This is given the initial conditions for the state variables and the values of the feedback
scal policy coe¢ cients in the associated scal policy rules. We present the clearing market
conditions and the full equilibrium system in the Appendices B and C respectively.17
2.10 Plan of the rest of the paper
In the rest of the paper we work as follows. First, using common structural parameter values
and scal policy data from the EA-19 over the period 2001-2015 we solve for the steady state
solution of the model in Section 3. We explain our calibration strategy in Section 3.1. The long
run solution is computed in Section 3.2. Throughout the paper we refer to this solution as the
status quo economy. In our policy experiments we use this solution as point of departure in
order to evaluate debt consolidation policies under constrained optimized scal rules. Our scal
policy experiment is described in Section 4.
Second, we compute various steady state reformed economies in which public debt to GDP
ratio is lower. In the reformed economies thanks to public debt reduction one scal instrument
can adjust in the reformed steady state to reap the benet of the scal adjustment (scal gain).
We study various reformed economies depending on which scal instrument adjusts in the new
steady state. Aggregate and distributional long run e¤ects are computed in Section 5.1.
Third, we compute the transitional dynamics from the status quo economy with high debt
to GDP ratio to a reformed economy with lower public debt to GDP ratio. Aggregate and
distributional e¤ects in the transition are presented in Section 5.2.
In Section 6 we analyze the transmission mechanism of debt consolidation under the con-
strained optimized scal policy. Finally, we conduct a sensitivity analysis in Section 7.
17As the DCE system presented in the Appendix C shows, policy instruments distort rst order conditions and
resource constraints in several ways. These distortions are referred to as wedges in the related macroeconomic
literature (see e.g. Chari et al., 2007). In particular, because of consumption taxes, labor taxes, capital taxes,
government spending on infrastructure and government spending on education, there are wedges in agentslabor
supply and investment decisions, while, because of government spending on infrastructure, education, utility-
enhancing services and transfer payments, there are also wedges in budget constraints and resource constraints.
This is typical of economic environments without lump-sum policy instruments. Here, however, the aim is to
investigate the implications of debt consolidation by using the full model in hand, rather than to identify the role
of each friction/wedge in a historical episode.
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3 Calibration and status quo long run equilibrium
In this section we discuss our calibration choices and present the steady state solution of the
model.
3.1 Parameter values and scal policy data
In Table 1a we report the values of the structural parameters. In Table 1b we report the scal
policy instruments values using scal data averages for the EA-19 over the period 2001-2015.
Parameter values and scal policy instruments are chosen so that the models long run solution
targets various observed key macroeconomic ratios of the EA-19 economy (see Table 2). We
employ data from the following resources: AMECO database of the European Commission,
Eurostat COFOG (Classication of Functions of Government), OECD Education at a Glance
(EAG), LFS (labor Force Survey), EU-SILC (Social Income and Living Conditions), Household
Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), SES (Structure of Earnings). Below we analyze in
detail our calibration strategy.
Population shares In the present model households di¤er along two dimensions, i.e. ac-
cess to nancial/capital markets and skills. We set nP = 0:3 and nR = 0:7 so that 30% of
total population does not participate in capital and nancial markets which is within the range
reported by Coenen et al. (2008). This is in line with data on household savings in HFCS
which reports that the asymmetric savings distribution is also reected in income distribution.
For instance, in the Euro Area the richest 20% income group holds over 60% of total savings.
Regarding the skills distribution, as is dened by the International Standard Classication of
Education (ISCED), data from Eurostat indicate that in the EA-19 a range from 30% to 35%
has at least attained lower secondary education (i.e. 10 years of education) while the rest has
attained at least post-secondary non-tertiary and tertiary education which roughly matches our
parameter choices for nR and nP . Finally, data from EU-SILC report that high income groups
as well as high savings groups in the population exhibit relatively higher educational attainment
rates. Thus, we deem there exists enough evidence to associate savings and income with skills
and education.
Preferences and parameters common to all agents The time discount factor  is set so
as to give an annual real interest rate equal to 2.25% which is consistent with data on EA-19 (see
AMECO database). The preference parameters f1; 2; g are calibrated so that the weighted
average of skilled and unskilled hours worked is 0.232. It also implies that in steady state Rich
households devote more time to labor relative to Poor (see Table 2 in the next subsection).18
We set the depreciation rates of physical and public capital

k; g
	
equal to 6%, as in Coenen
18This is in accordance with the Eurostat LFS data which reports that the average hours worked per week of full
time employment is 41.5 hours out 168 hours of the whole week. This gives an average labor time of 0.247 which
is almost equal to our calculated value. The same survey reports that workers occupied in skilled professions (e.g.
managers, professionals, engineers) record higher weekly hours worked than than those of unskilled professions
(e.g. clerical stu¤, technicians etc). Our numerical solution is consistent with these data.
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et al. (2008). Given that there is not a clear consensus on the magnitude of the depreciation of
human capital we assume h = k = g = 6%.
Production We normalize the scale parameter A to 1. We calibrate the parameter, v =
 0:553, which governs the elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labor, 11 v =
0:6439, and the parameter,  = 0:323, which governs the elasticity of substitution between
capital/skilled labor and unskilled labor, 11  = 1:4771; jointly so as to match the target of 1.55
for the value of skill premium which is consistent with the data.19 Our calibrated values lie
within the range of values estimated in Krusell et al. (2000) and Maliar et al. (2017). Then,
we set the remaining parameters of the production function, f;mg, so that the models status
quo solution is consistent with data on factor inputs shares such as labor income share, capital
income share. The choice of the parameter  along with the depreciation rate of physical and
public capital imply a physical capital to GDP ratio of 2.97 and a public capital to GDP ratio
of 0.51.
Human capital Next, we set the parameters governing the production of new human capital
of each household type. The sets of parameters fBR; BP g and fxR; xP g both relate to technology
and ability in the creation of new human capital and skills. For this reason, similar to He and
Liu (2008) and Angelopoulos, Benecchi and Malley (2017) we normalize BR and BP equal to 1
and let xR = 0:40 > xP = 0:35 to capture any di¤erences in ability between the two household
types. In essence, this choice reects the standard Mincerian logic which assumes that Rich
households due to their higher education status, obtain higher returns. We set the value of the
elasticity parameter of education time with respect to new human capital  equal to 0.8 so that
1   = 0:2 as in Blankenau et al. (2004). This implies that households devote 13% on average
of their time endowment to skill enhancing activities. Note that in the model both time spent
on education and public education spending are meant to be post-formal schooling. This implies
that both agents have already acquired a minimum of 10 years of education.20
Policy To set the long run values of scal variables we employ data from Eurostat for EA-
19 over 2001-2015. In particular, we set the long run values of tax instruments equal to the
associated 2001-2015 average e¤ective average tax rates, i.e. e¤ective tax rate on consumption
is equal to 19.8%, e¤ective tax rate on labor is equal to 46.75% and e¤ective tax rate on capital
is equal to 36.8%.21 We set public debt to GDP ratio in the status quo economy equal to
19The value of the skill premium typically ranges from 1.45 to 1.80 depending on the country, timeframe and
method of measurement (for an overview of inequality measures see Krueger et al. (2008) while for measurement
issues see Crivellaro (2016) and OECD Education at a Glance reports (2008-2018)). For our target value we use
OECDs Relative Earnings by educational attainment indicator.
20Data on the share of time that individuals spend on education are not available at this level of heterogeneity.
Thus, we use as proxy the following formula. Skilled individuals devote on average at least 7 additional years to
post-formal schooling educational activities. Under the assumption that the average retirement age is 63 years old
and that working life begins at 16 years old, this implies 47 years of working life duration or an additional 14.8%
of their time devoted to education (7/47 years). Similarly assuming that unskilled agents will devote 3 additional
years to obtain at least an upper-secondary degree this implies an additional 12% of their time endowment on
post-formal education activities.
21E¤ective tax rates are constructed following the methodology in Mendoza et al. (1994) more details on the
methodology and the associated database are provided in Kostarakos and Varthalitis (2019).
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85.3% which is consistent with EA-19 data over the period of scal stress between 2008-2014.22
Regarding public spending instruments we set transfers as a share of GDP equal to 25.4%.23
Recall that as pointed out above we assume that transfers are unevenly distributed between the
two household types favouring Poor households. Given the di¢ culty to retrieve the exact share
allocated to each household type we assume that Poor households receive double the amount
of transfers in nominal terms relative to Rich households. The rest of the public expenditure
sub-components have been retrieved from Eurostat COFOG database which breaks down public
spending per functional use. This provides an elegant disentanglement of total public spending
into the main spending components of our model. For instance, public spending on education,
sg
e
, is set at 1%, which is close to the post-formal schooling public spending on education.24 For
simplicity we assume that this share is equally allocated between the two household types, i.e.
we set ! = 0:5. Spending on public investment as a share of GDP, sg
i
, is set at 3.1%, based on
data reported in the Economic A¤airs function of the COFOG database. Finally, we allow the
output share of government consumption, sg
c
, to be residually determined.25
22Particularly we use the time series "General government consolidated gross debt - Excessive decit procedure
based on ESA 2010".
23This includes the items of social benets and other current transfers as those are dened in Eurostat National
Accounts Indicators (ESA 2010).
24This includes mainly government expenditure on tertiary education, post-secondary education other than
tertiary and upper secondary education level.
25 In our model the denition of government consumption follows the COFOG database denition, and thus,
includes a broad range of government functions such as general public services, public order and defence, recreation
and culture, environmental protection, household and community amenities, health.
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Table 1a: Parameter values
Parameter Denition Value
Households
0    1 time discount factor 0.978
0 <  < 1 public consumption weight in composite consumption 0.100
1 > 0 preference weight in the utility 0.400
2 > 0 preference weight in the utility 0.600
0  k  1 depreciation rate of physical capital 0.060
0  h  1 depreciation rate of human capital 0.060
0  g  1 depreciation rate of public capital 0.060
0 < nR < 1 population share of Rich 0.700
0 < nP < 1 population share of Poor 0.300
Production
0 <  < 1 share of composite input 0.980
 < 1 capital and skilled labor to unskilled labor substitution 0.323
v < 1 capital to skilled labor substitution -0.553
0 < m < 1 labor share of Rich 0.200
0 <  < 1 share of physical capital in the composite input 0.680
0    1 elasticity of education time 0.800
0  1    1 elasticity of public education spending 0.200
A > 0 scale parameter 1.000
BR > 0 human capital technology parameter of Rich 1.000
BP > 0 human capital technology parameter of Poor 1.000
0 < xR < 1 returns to scale for new human capital of Rich 0.400
0 < xP < 1 returns to scale for new human capital of Poor 0.350
15
Table 1b: Fiscal policy instruments
Instrument Denition Value
Tax rates
k capital tax rate 0.368
 l labor tax rate 0.467
 c consumption tax rate 0.198
Public spending
sg
e
GDP share of public education spending 0.010
sg
c
GDP share of government consumption 0.223
sg
i
GDP share of public investment 0.030
str GDP share of government transfers 0.254
3.2 Status quo steady state solution
The steady state solution of the model, when we use the parameter values and the policy
instruments of Tables 1a-1b, is reported in Table 2. In what follows, we refer to this steady
state solution as the status quo economy and will serve as the point of departure for the scal
policy experiments studied in the next sections. The implied numerical solution replicates some
key macroeconomic ratios observed in the EA-19 like consumption as a share of output, physical
capital as a share of output, debt as a share of output and skill premium.26
26Note that the values in Table 2 are dened as follows: r  (1   k)(r   k)  rb; c
y
 nRcR+nRcR
nfy
; kR
y

nRkR
nfy
; q  nRbR
nfy
.
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Table 2: Status quo solution
Main variables Model
cR consumption of Rich 1.2494
cP consumption of Poor 0.9327
lR skilled labor 0.2444
lP unskilled labor 0.2020
eR time in education of Rich 0.1419
eP time in education of Poor 0.1026
r real return to physical capital 0.0224
y output 2.9556
Key ratios Model Data
c
y consumption as share of GDP 0.5580 0.5580
kR
y physical capital as share of GDP 2.9600 2.9600
q debt as a share of GDP 0.8530 0.8530
wR
wP
skill premium 1.5500 1.5500
4 Fiscal policy experiment
In this section, we dene the scal policy experiments. The economy starts from its status quo
steady state, as computed in Table 2, and travels towards a new reformed steady state with lower
public debt-to-GDP ratio. Since public debt-to-GDP ratio is lower in the new reformed economy,
the government can exploit the resulting scal space to increase public spending and/or reduce
taxes. On the other hand, the opposite should happen in the transition to the new reformed
steady state since such a debt reduction unavoidably requires cuts in spending and/or rises in
taxes in the short and medium term.
Specically, in the new reformed steady state, the debt-to-output ratio is reduced from 85.3%,
which is the EA-19 data average over the scal stress period 2008-2014, to 60%; this exogenous
reduction allows one spending (tax) instrument to increase (decrease) residually. Note that
the 60% policy target is chosen simply to reect the criteria set by the Maastrict Treaty. The
government can achieve the transition from the status quo to the new reformed steady state by
implementing di¤erent scal policy mixes following the scal feedback rules given by equations
(60)-(67) in the Appendix C. We will compute constrained optimized scal policy rules so as our
results will not depend on ad hoc di¤erences in feedback policy coe¢ cients. To do this, we follow
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004, 2007) so that we limit our attention to scal rules that satisfy
the following conditions. First, they are constrained, i.e. the scal instruments can react to a
small number of easily observable macroeconomic indicators. Second, this reaction guarantees
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local determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium.27 Third, they are optimized, i.e.
policymakers choose the feedback policy coe¢ cients to maximize a welfare criterion. The welfare
criterion is the weighted conditional welfare of the Rich and Poor households as dened in (1)
and (8) respectively, i.e. W0 = enVR;0+(1  en)VP;0, where en denotes the weight assigned to Rich
households lifetime welfare. In our main experiments, we assume a Benthamite government
meaning that we set the weights in the governments objective function equal to the associated
population shares, i.e. en = nR: Notice that welfare is computed conditional on the initial
conditions which are given by the status quo solution as computed in Table 2.28
5 Main Results
In this section, we present the aggregate and distributional implications of scal consolidation as
dened above. Subsection 5.1 focuses on the reformed steady state, while, transition results are
in subsection 5.2. To quantify aggregate e¤ects, we will employ variables such as output, y, and
social welfare,W , while, to measure distributional e¤ects, we nd it natural to use variables like
the net income29 of Rich and Poor households, ynetR and y
net
P respectively, the relative net income
(dened as the ratio of the Rich households net income to the net income of the Poor household,
ynetR
ynetP
), the skill premium (which is typically dened as wRwP ), household specic welfares, VR and
VP ; and the relative welfare (dened as the ratio of the Rich households discounted lifetime
utility to the discounted lifetime utility of the Poor household, VRVP ).
5.1 Aggregate and distributional implications of debt consolidation in the
reformed steady state
In this subsection, we present the new reformed steady state. As in e.g. Coenen et al. (2008)
and Philippopoulos et al. (2015, 2017a, 2017b), once the debt-to-output ratio has been reduced,
the government can increase spending or/and decrease taxes by taking advantage of the scal
space created; this is the so called long run scal gain of debt consolidation.
Table 3 presents the key endogenous variables of the model capturing aggregate and distri-
butional e¤ects. In this table, we vary the residual scal instrument that adjusts in the long
run and present the associated values of output, y, household specic net incomes, ynetR and
ynetP ; the relative net income,
ynetR
ynetP
, and skill premium, wRwP . All values in Table 3 are reported
27 In addition, when necessary, we further restrict the vector of policy coe¢ cients to lie within a space that
delivers plausible values for scal instruments, i.e. sg
c
; sg
i
; sg
e
; strP ; strP > 0 and 0 <  c; k; n < 1:
28 In particular, we take a second order approximation to both the equilibrium conditions and the welfare
criterion. First, we compute a second order approximation of both conditional welfare and the decentralized
equilibrium around the reformed steady state as functions of the vector of feedback policy coe¢ cients. Then, we
use an optimization routine like fminsearch to compute the values of the feedback policy coe¢ cients that maximize
the conditional welfare criterion. For more details see Philippopoulos et al. (2017a) and (2017b). Dynare and
Matlab routines are available upon request.
29Net income is dened as gross income minus all types of taxes, i.e. net income of Rich households
is ynetR;t 
 
1  kt

(rtkR;t + t) +
 
1   lt

wR;tlR;thR;t + r
b
tbR;t + trR;t    ctcR;t; and of Poor households is
ynetP;t 
 
1   lt

wP;tlP;thP;t + trP;t    ctcP;t:
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as percentage deviations from their status quo values. A positive (negative) value implies an
increase (decrease) vis-à-vis its status quo value. The rst column of Table 3 reports which s-
cal instrument adjusts in the new steady state taking advantage of the post-consolidation scal
space, while, in the last column we compute the magnitude of the associated scal adjustment.
The scal instruments which adjust in the new reformed economies are the output share of
government consumption, sg
c
, the output share of government investment, sg
i
, the output share
of public transfers to Poor households30, strP , the output share of public spending on education,
sg
e
, the tax rates on consumption,  c, labor income,  l, and capital income, k. To understand
the mechanisms of each reform, we experiment with one spending/tax policy instrument at a
time keeping the others constant at their status quo values.
Table 3: Steady state output and distributional e¤ects
in the various reformed economies (as % deviations from status quo)
Fiscal
Instr.
y ynetR y
net
P
ynetR
ynetP
wR
wP
Inst
sg
c
0.0069 -0.0042 0.0058 -0.0100 -0.0077 0.0047
sg
i
0.0124 0.0016 0.0111 -0.0095 -0.0069 0.0047
strP 0.0009 -0.0034 0.0128 -0.0162 -0.0129 0.0056
sg
e
0.0279 0.0168 0.0261 -0.0093 -0.0120 0.0047
 c 0.0079 0.0052 0.0153 -0.0101 -0.0074 -0.0101
 l 0.0158 0.0137 0.0217 -0.0080 -0.0051 -0.0095
k 0.0175 0.0119 0.0150 -0.0031 -0.0005 -0.0133
A key message from Table 3 is that debt consolidation is always output enhancing and,
perhaps more interestingly, progressive in the long run. That is, output, y, increases (see
column 2 in Table 3), while relative net income (income inequality), y
net
R
ynetP
, and skill premium
(wage inequality), wRwP , decrease (see column 4 and 5 in Table 3 respectively) vis-a-vis their
status quo value in all reformed economies. Thus, scal consolidation can improve both equity
and e¢ ciency in the long run.
Regarding output, debt consolidation is more productive in the long run when the government
increases its productive spending (like public spending on education or investment) or reduces
distortionary taxation. Actually, the best instrument to use in terms of output, as well as in
terms of net income of all individuals, is public spending on education.
The relative income, y
net
R
ynetP
; decreases in all reformed economies which means that debt con-
solidation benets more the Poor households. This is mostly driven by the sharp decrease in
the income coming from government bonds earned by Rich households which gets lower under
debt consolidation.31 The reduction in the net income of Rich households is less striking when
the government reduces income taxes (see the last two rows in Table 3) for two reasons. First,
30To save space, we do not report results for public transfers to Rich household, strR : Note that for Rich
households the Ricardian equivalence holds, thus, the long run e¤ects are trivial.
31These ndings are in line with Schwarzmüller and Wolters (2015). However, they focus on consumption
inequality rather than net income and wages.
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lower income taxes imply higher wealth; recall that Rich households earn capital income while
they receive higher wages than Poor households.32 Second, the resulting increase in output re-
quires additional physical capital and, due to the complementarity between physical capital and
skilled labor, more skilled than unskilled labor, which again favors the Rich households. These
e¤ects moderate the adverse e¤ect on the net income of Rich households from the decrease in
income coming from bond holdings. In terms of wage inequality (see column 4 in Table 3), debt
consolidation always reduces the skill premium in the long run.33
Similar studies have examined the e¤ects of scal consolidation on aggregate welfare (see
e.g. Bi and Kumhof (2011) and Philippopoulos et al. (2017a) and (2017b)). To this end, in
Table 4, we compute the percentage deviations of social welfare, W , Rich and Poor households
discounted lifetime steady state welfare, VR and VP respectively, as well as the relative welfare,
VR
VP
.
Table 4: Steady state social and individual
life-time welfare (as % deviations from status quo34)
Fiscal
Instr.
W VR VP
VR
VP
sg
c
-0.0077 -0.0225 0.0174 -0.0407
sg
i
0.0042 -0.0089 0.0264 -0.0363
strP 0.0047 -0.0158 0.0394 -0.0574
sg
e
0.0781 0.0769 0.0801 -0.0035
 c 0.0131 0.0009 0.0337 -0.0339
 l 0.0235 0.0145 0.0387 -0.0252
k 0.0271 0.0214 0.0368 -0.0161
Welfare results in Table 4 are consistent with the ndings in Table 3. In particular, scal
consolidation enhances social welfare and also reduces the welfare gap between Rich and Poor
households in all reformed economies. Similarly to the results in Table 3, the increase in govern-
ment spending on education yields the highest welfare gains both for the society and for each
income class of households. Also, using the scal space created by debt consolidation to nance
an increase in spending on public education and/or to nance a cut in distortionary taxation
32Table E.1 in Appendix E presents the various sources of income by household type as percentage deviations
from their status quo value.
33The net e¤ect on skill premium depends on which of the capital-skill complementarity or the relative skill
supply e¤ect dominates. On the one hand, the increase in output requires more physical capital pushing skill
premium upwards. On the other hand, relative skill supply increases pushing skill premium in the opposite
direction. In our experiments the latter e¤ect is stronger.
34 In Table 4 a positive (negative) value denotes a welfare improvement (deterioration) vis-à-vis its status quo
value. Since we assume logarithmic utility function, welfare takes negative values, i.e. W;VR; VP < 0: For
illustrative purposes, we dene the percentage deviations of, say social welfare measure, from its status quo value
as (
W) (WSQ)
jWSQj ; where W
 and WSQ denote social steady state welfare in any reformed economy and status
quo economy respectively. In contrast the relative welfare is a positive number, VR
VP
> 0. In Table 4, we report
VR
VP
SQ   VR
VP


VR
VP
SQ : As before, a positive (negative) value means that the welfare gap increases (decreases).
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is Pareto e¢ cient, i.e., both Rich and Poor households get better o¤ in the reformed economy.
On the other hand, scal consolidation is not always Pareto e¢ cient. For example, although
increases in government consumption, public transfers targeted to Poor households and public
investment can also enhance the aggregate output, while, the last two also improve the social
welfare, they are not Pareto e¢ cient. Any small social welfare gains arise solely because of the
increase in Poor householdswelfare; the results in Table 4 show that the welfare of the Rich is
reduced.
5.2 Aggregate and distributional implications of debt consolidation along the
transition
In this section, we focus our analysis on the transition implications of public debt consolidation.
The economy departs from its status quo steady state and moves towards a new reformed
economy with lower debt to GDP ratio equal to 60%.35 This requires scal policy to use one (or
more) scal instruments to react to debt deviations from its new target. We focus our analysis
on constrained optimized scal policy rules as analyzed in section 4.
The optimized policy mix suggest that scal policy should cut government consumption
sharply to consolidate its debt while at the same time keep constant distortionary taxation
and productive public spending. The resulting optimized values of feedback policy coe¢ cients
reported in the note of Table 5 suggest that increasing distortionary income taxation and/or
decreasing productive spending to reduce public debt is not recommended. These results are
consistent with ndings in similar studies see in Philippopoulos et al. (2015) and (2017b).
Table 5 computes the average percentage deviations from their status quo value of output, y,
relative net income, y
net
R
ynetP
; and skill premium, wRwP ; over various time horizons under the constrained
optimized scal policy.36
Table 5: Output, net income ratio and skill premium
over various time horizons with optimized policy
Variable 2 years 4 years 6 years 10 years
y 0.002 0.013 0.0155 0.016
ynetR
ynetP
-0.037 -0.033 -0.031 -0.027
wR
wP
0.0443 0.0277 0.0208 0.0138
Note: The constrained optimized policy coe¢ cients are
g
c
q =0:7; cq = 
l
q = 
k
q = 
ge
q = 
gi
q = trRq = 
trP
q = 0
35To save space, we present results for the transition to a reformed economy in which government consumption is
the scal instrument that reaps the benet of debt reduction. In section 7.3 we present the associated transitional
dynamics when the economy travels towards the reformed economies where public spending on education or
capital tax are the residual scal instruments. Results for the rest of the reformed economies reported in Table 3
are available upon request.
36Table 5 presents results from model based simulations generated by the rst order accurate approximation of
the equilibrium system.
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Results in Table 5 imply that scal consolidation is e¢ cient in the medium and long run
meaning that aggregate output, y; increases above its pre-reform value after the second year.
Also, the relative net income, y
net
R
ynetP
; is reduced over all time horizons. This is attributed to the
sharp reduction of the Rich householdsincome coming from bonds over all time horizons and
to the temporary reduction in their capital income. However, wage inequality, wRwP ; widens for a
prolonged period. As we also discuss below, debt consolidation results in an increase in physical
capital stock which due to the capital-skill complementarity channel in our model increases skill
premium.
Similarly, Table 6 presents social welfare and household specic welfare as percentage devia-
tions from a reference regime37 under the constrained optimized scal consolidation policy over
various time horizons.38 A positive value implies that the associated welfare criterion increases
vis-à-vis the reference regime.
Table 6: Welfare over various time horizons with optimized policy
Welfare 2 years 4 years 6 years 10 years
Social 0.018 0.0383 0.0538 0.0736
Rich 0.0354 0.0558 0.0704 0.087
Poor -0.0236 -0.0027 0.0150 0.0421
Note: Feedbacks as in Table 5.
Welfare results in Table 6 suggest that scal consolidation is social welfare enhancing over all
time horizons (see second row), however, it does not produce a Pareto e¢ cient outcome in the
short run. In particular, in the rst four years this reform hurts Poor households and benets
Rich households. As can be seen in Table 6, Poor householdswelfare is reduced over the rst
four years (see fourth row), while, Rich households welfare increases in short/medium run (see
third row). That is debt consolidation is Pareto e¢ cient only in the medium and long run. To
understand the logic of the results in Tables 5 and 6 we discuss the underlying transmission
mechanism in the next section.
6 The underlying transmission mechanism
In this section we present the dynamic paths of the key endogenous variables of the model during
the transition phase of scal consolidation. This provides insight into the transmission channel
of scal consolidation policy in our economy and allows us to understand the logic of our results
in Section 5. As before, the economy departs from its status quo steady state and travels to one
of the reformed economies reported in Section 5.1. Figure 1 depicts the dynamic paths of the
37We can use multiple reference regimes, for simplicity and comparability with results in Table 5, we compute
percentage deviations from a reference regime in which the economy stays at its status quo steady state forever.
38Table 6 presents results from model-based simulations generated by the second order accurate approximation
of the equilibrium system and the welfare criteria.
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main endogenous variables under the constrained optimized scal policy, while, in the long run,
the government uses the resulting scal space to increase government consumption.
Figure 1: Dynamic paths of the main endogenous variables with optimized policy
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status quo value. Total consumption is dened as c  nRcR+nP cP:
We start with aggregate e¤ects. Fiscal consolidation implemented via the constrained opti-
mized scal policy (i.e. via government consumption cuts39) decreases aggregate demand which
induces a temporary output contraction (see the dynamic path of y). Subsequently, the debt
adjustment and the sharp reduction in government consumption cause a reduction in real inter-
est rates, rb and r. This crowds in total private consumption, c, and investment, iR, whereas
the latter results in the rise of the physical capital stock; see the dynamic path of kR. Thus,
output recovers above its pre consolidation value and converges to its new higher value in the
reformed steady state. The increase in the capital stock is signicant and prolonged as the
economy converges to a reformed steady state with higher capital stock.
We now turn to the distributional implications of scal consolidation. First, due to the
capital-skill complementarity channel, the rise in physical capital induce an increase in the wages
of Rich (skilled) households,40 see the dynamic path of wR. Thus, the skill premium (wage
39To save space we present the dynamic paths of scal policy instruments and other endogenous variables in
Figure E.1 in the Appendix E.
40At the same time, Rich households substitute labor with leisure in the very short run (see Figure E.1 in
the Appendix E) and thus relative skill supply, lR;thR;t
lP;thP;t
decreases in equilibrium. Both relative skill supply and
capital skill complementarity e¤ects push upward skill premium.
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inequality), wRwP ; increases in the transition phase of scal consolidation. On the other hand,
relative net income, y
net
R
ynetP
; falls over the transition to the reformed steady state and converges
to its new lower value.41The relative net income is a function of various endogenous variables
of the model, thus, to understand its dynamic path, we decompose it into the various sources
of income of Rich and Poor households. Results in Figure 1 indicate that the decrease in
the relative income can be mostly attributed to the sharp decrease in the income coming from
government bonds (see the dynamic paths of rbbR), the temporary reduction in the capital
income due to the fall in the return on capital (see the dynamic path of r and rkR respectively)
and the higher income taxes paid by Rich households.42 On the other hand, the labor income of
Rich households, wRlRhR, increases relatively more than the labor income of Poor households,
wP lPhP , due to the capital-skill complementarity e¤ect.
Finally, to understand the welfare results in Table 6, we focus on the variables that enter the
utility functions of Rich and Poor households. Consumption of Rich households, cR, increases
due to the crowding in e¤ects induced by debt consolidation and the sharp fall in interests rates.
Also, since the labor income of Rich households increases (mostly due to the increase in their
wages), these households substitute hours worked with leisure. Both e¤ects enhance the welfare
of Rich households in the short/medium run.
On the other hand, debt consolidation puts downward pressure to the wages of Poor (un-
skilled) households, wP , and thus they reduce consumption, cP ; on impact; recall that they
cannot smooth their consumption over time. In addition, in the short run, due to lower wages,
they need to increase their labor supply to boost their labor income. Both consumption and
labor dynamics contribute to the welfare losses experienced by Poor households in the short
run.
7 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we conduct a sensitivity analysis. In Sections 7.1 and 7.2, we focus on the key
sources of inequality in our model to shed light on the di¤erent channels through which they
a¤ect our main results. In section 7.3, we discuss transitional dynamics towards alternative
reformed economies. In Section 7.4, we discuss similarities of constrained optimized scal policy
with a Ramsey-type policy in our model. Finally, Section 7.5 reports sensitivity tests with
respect to other key structural parameters of the model. In all the exercises conducted in this
section, we compute the constrained optimized scal policy rules as stated in Section 4 under
the new calibration and/or modelling changes. Here, we report that the optimized policy mix
remains the same.
41 In an earlier version of this paper we show that income inequality can increase in the short run under an ad
hoc (non optimized) spending based scal consolidation policy see in Sakkas and Varthalitis (2018).
42Although government imposes identical tax rates to both households, distortionary taxes are analogous to
income. This implies that a relatively higher income increase is accompanied with higher taxes.
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7.1 Capital-skill complementarity
In this section we focus on the structural parameter that governs the capital-skill complemen-
tarity (CSC), i.e. v < 1, in equation (13) in section 2.5. This parameter governs the elasticity
of substitution between physical capital and skilled labor, 11 v . A smaller (larger) value of v
(i.e. a smaller (larger) value of 11 v ) corresponds to a higher (lower) degree of complementarity
between skilled labor and physical capital.
Figure 2 presents the dynamic paths of the key endogenous variables of the model in three
economies when we vary the degree of capital-skill complementarity. First, the blue lines present
the dynamic responses from Section 6 (we include these for comparison); recall that the value
of v in the benchmark calibration is equal to  0:553 (which means 11 v = 0:6439): Second,
the yellow lines present the dynamic responses in an economy which exhibits lower capital-
skill complementarity (labeled as low-CSC), for example we set v = 0:1 >  0:55: Notice
that this value implies a higher elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labor
with respect to the benchmark economy, i.e. 11 v = 1:11 > 0:6439. Third, the red lines simu-
late an economy which exhibits higher capital-skill complementarity (labeled as high-CSC ), for
example we set v =  1 <  0:55: Similarly, this value implies a lower elasticity of substitu-
tion between capital and skilled labor with respect to the benchmark economy, i.e. 11 v = 0:5 <
0:6439.
Figure 2: Dynamic paths of the main endogenous variables under various degrees of
capital-skill complementarity
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Comparing the dynamic paths of aggregate output, y; relative income, y
net
R
ynetP
, and skill pre-
mium, wRwP , we infer that debt consolidations aggregate and distributional e¤ects remain quali-
tatively similar across the three economies (compare benchmark, blue lines, with high-CSC, red
lines, and low-CSC, yellow lines).
However, as expected, the capital-skill complementarity channel plays a key role in the
dynamics of wage inequality (see the dynamic path of wRwP across the three economies). A larger
degree of capital-skill complementarity (i.e. lower elasticity of substitution between capital and
skilled labor, 11 v ) favors Rich households in the early phase of scal consolidation in terms of
wage and labor income. Particularly, as the degree of capital-skill complementarity increases, the
wage of Rich households, wR; increases more, while the wage of Poor households, wP ; decreases
relatively more and thus wage inequality, wRwP ; widens. Similarly, the increase in the labor income
of Rich households, wRlRhR; is larger, while, the increase in the labor income of Poor household,
wP lPhP ; is smaller as we increase the degree of capital skill complementarity.
The logic of these results is the following. A larger degree of capital-skill complementarity
(i.e. a lower value of v) in the production function results in, ceteris paribus, a larger reduction
in the marginal product of capital, see the dynamic path of r. This subsequently leads to a larger
rise in the physical capital stock in the short run, kR, and thus, due to the higher capital-skill
complementarity, a higher rise in the wage of Rich (skilled) households, wR:
On the other hand, the short run reduction in the relative income, y
net
R
ynetP
; is relatively bigger
(smaller) on impact in the high (low)-CSC economy, while, in the medium run, the dynamic
paths are almost identical with the one of the benchmark economy. This mostly happens due
to the larger (smaller) reduction in real rates, see the dynamic paths of r and rb; which imply
a larger (smaller) decrease in capital income, rkR, and income coming from government bonds,
rbbR; for Rich households.
7.2 Access to capital/nancial markets
In this section we relax the assumption that Poor households have no access to nancial/capital
markets. In particular, we allow both Rich and Poor households to accumulate physical capital
and save in the form of government bonds subject to transactions costs as in e.g. Angelopoulos
et al. (2014). The role of transactions costs is twofold, rst to guarantee a well dened steady
state solution and ensure stationarity in the transition, second to allow us to maintain hetero-
geneity in asset holdings between Rich and Poor households. To do this, we assume that Poor
households face consistently higher transactions costs than Rich households which implies that
Rich households have consistently higher wealth than Poor households. To save space we present
modelling details in Appendix D. For illustrative purposes, here we report that the associated
parameters which measure the size of these transactions costs for capital and government bonds
are denoted as R; R and P ; P for Rich and Poor households respectively.
To understand the role of asset heterogeneity in our main results, in this section, we present
results from three economies varying the degree of nancial constraints faced by Poor households.
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As we increase the magnitude of the associated transactions costs for Poor households, asset
heterogeneity increases since the Poor reduce their asset holdings and rely more on labor income.
In Figure 3, rst, we simulate an economy in which we allow Poor households to accumu-
late physical capital and save in the form of government bonds. As said, to maintain asset
heterogeneity they are subject to relatively higher transaction costs than Rich households, for
example we set R = R = 0:001 < P = P = 0:01. Second, we simulate an economy in
which we further increase asset heterogeneity between the Rich and the Poor. That is Poor
households can still accumulate physical capital and save in the form of government bonds but
now are subject to much higher transaction costs than Rich households, for example we set
R = R = 0:001 < P = P = 0:1. The latter economy is closer to the economy presented in
Section 6, where Poor households live hand to mouth. Finally, for comparison, we also include
results from Section 6.
Figure 3 presents the dynamic responses of the key endogenous variables in the three
economies under the constrained optimized scal rules.
Figure 3: Dynamic paths of the main endogenous variables under various degrees of asset
heterogeneity
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Figure 3 shows that the degree of asset heterogeneity does not alter signicantly the aggregate
e¤ects of scal consolidation, however, as expected, it a¤ects its distributional implications.
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Perhaps, a rather novel nding is that the degree of asset heterogeneity a¤ects signicantly
wage inequality wRwP : That is the higher the transactions costs faced by Poor households, i.e. the
larger the inequality in asset distribution, the larger the increase in wage inequality in the short
run phase of scal consolidation. This is apparent when we compare the impact response of wRwP
in the benchmark economy, where, Poor households have zero access in nancial markets (blue
lines) with the economies where we allow them partial access to nancial markets subject to
high/low transactions costs (see red/yellow lines respectively).
In the latter economies, the negative e¤ect of debt consolidation on Poor households is less
severe since they do not solely rely on labor income. As a result they do not need to increase
labor supply and substitute leisure with labor to the same extent as in the benchmark economy.
For that reason, the equilibrium wage of Poor households, wP , increases in the short run which
leads to a smaller increase in wage inequality vis-à-vis the benchmark economy.
Finally, as expected, the relative net income, y
net
R
ynetP
; reduces less as we decrease asset hetero-
geneity. Now, since Poor households earn income from government bonds and capital, their
income decreases analogously to the income of Rich households coming from the same sources
(due to reasons discussed in Section 6) causing a smaller reduction in the relative income (income
inequality):
7.3 Transition towards alternative reformed economies
In section 5.1, we showed that the long run aggregate and distributional e¤ects of debt consoli-
dation depend on the scal instrument which adjusts in the new reformed steady state to exploit
the post consolidation scal space. So far in our analysis of the transmission mechanism, we
present results from the case in which scal policy adjusts government consumption in the new
reformed steady state. In Figure 4, we present the dynamic paths of key endogenous variables of
the model when the economy departs from the status quo steady state, as above, and converges
to two of the alternative reformed economies discussed in Section 5.1. That is, scal policy
implements the constrained optimized scal policy rules computed as in Section 4, while, the
economy converges to two alternative reformed steady states, namely, where the government
increases public spending on education, sg
e
; or decreases capital tax, k: For notational con-
venience, in this section we label each of these policy experiments using the scal instrument
utilized in the new reformed steady state.
As above, for comparison, the blue lines present the dynamic responses of Section 6 (labeled
as sg
c
). In addition, the red lines present the dynamic responses for the case in which the
government exploits the scal space to increase public spending on education in the new reformed
steady state (labelled as sg
e
). Finally, yellow lines present the dynamic responses for the case in
which the government cuts capital taxes in the new reformed steady state (labelled as k). We
choose these reformed economies simply because they deliver the best steady state welfare and
output outcomes (see Tables 3 and 4 in Section 5.1).
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Figure 4: Dynamic paths of the main endogenous variables when the economy converges to
alternative reformed economies
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We report that the constrained optimized scal policy does not depend on the reformed
steady state at which the economy travels to. Also, Figure 4 indicates that our key results
analyzed in Section 6 remain the same. However, some new results are worth mentioning.
First, the larger long run aggregate benet of scal consolidation, arising from a more e¢ cient
allocation of the post consolidation scal space, can be brought forward in the short/medium
run. This is reected in the dynamic paths of endogenous variables like output, aggregate
consumption and physical capital. Regarding output, y, the recession on impact is smaller,
while, the rebound in the medium run is larger when the scal space is used more e¢ ciently. In
addition, the increase in aggregate consumption, c, and physical capital, kR; are larger and more
persistent when the economy travels to the reformed economies studied in this section (compare
the blue lines, sg
c
, with the red, sg
e
; and yellow lines, k).
This e¤ect works through the expectation channel, that is, households and rms anticipate
the positive e¤ects from the increase in productive spending on education or the reduction in
capital taxes and adjust their behaviour in the short run. However, investment in physical and
human capital take time to materialize, and thus the positive e¤ects are more evident in the
medium/long run.
Short run dynamic responses in Figure 4 are also consistent with ndings in Section 5.1.
That is, as highlighted in Section 5.1, using the scal space created by debt consolidation to
nance an increase in spending on education or to nance a cut in distortionary capital tax yields
relatively better outcomes than the benchmark economy for both Rich and Poor households in
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the short and medium run as well as in the long run. For example, Rich households experience
a larger increase in their capital income in the medium run (see rkR) and labor income in the
short/medium run (see wRlRhR) and, at the same time, Poor households also experience a
larger increase in their labor income (see wP lPhP ).
A clear cut message is that using the scal space to nance policies that induce long run
positive supply side e¤ects benets both households.
7.4 Discussion of the Ramsey approach
In this paper, in accordance with most of the related literature on debt consolidation (see the
Introductory section), we have focused on constrained optimized state-contingent policy rules.
That is, the values of policy instruments over time can deviate from their trend values by reacting
optimally to a number of macroeconomic indicators, but these trend values are set as in the data
averages rather than chosen optimally. Alternatively, one could compute Ramsey-type optimal
policy, meaning completely optimal state-contingent policy rules. Our approach can by justied
by the fact that institutional and political constraints do not allow for a fully optimal Ramsey-
type policy, especially when one considers scal policy (see also e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe,
2005, Kirsanova et al., 2007, Philippopoulos et al., 2017b). Nevertheless, it is worth pointing
out that the policy message coming from our constrained optimized rules is in accordance with
the typical Ramsey recipe. Namely, under both approaches, the optimal design of scal policy
takes the form of higher productivity-enhancing spending and/or lower capital taxes in the long
run, while, in the short, any required increase in revenues should be achieved by changes in the
least distorting scal instrument which, in our model (as is common in the debt consolidation
literature), is cuts in non-productive public spending.
7.5 Other parameters
We conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to other structural parameters of the model, namely
the degree of complementarity/substitutability between private and public consumption, 0 <
 < 0:2, human capital technology parameters, 0:9 < BP  BR < 1:1, parameters that govern
the returns to scale for Rich and Poor human capital, 0:25 < xP  xR < 0:5, the weights in
the governments objective function, i.e. 0:5 < en < 0:8. We report that our main results do not
change (the full set of results is available upon request from the authors).
8 Conclusions and possible extensions
In this paper, we assessed the aggregate and distributional implications of scal consolidation
policy using a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. Since the main
results have been summarized in the Introduction, we close with some possible extensions.
A possible extension is to depart from the closed economy setup and study similar questions in
an open economy model allowing for international mobility of capital and labor (i.e. migration).
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This could leave room for studying cross-border e¤ects. Potential frictions in international
capital and labor mobility could be an additional source of heterogeneity among di¤erent types of
households. Thus, scal consolidation policy could a¤ect aggregate and distributional outcomes
through additional channels. We leave these extensions for future work.
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A First order conditions
A.1 Rich households
Each Rich household in any given period t, chooses cR;t; eR;t, lR;t; kR;t+1,bR;t+1, hR;t+1 to
maximize its lifetime utility subject to the constraints (4) (in which we incorporate (6) and
(7)) and (5) taking factor prices and policy as given. Dening as R;t and  R;t the Lagrange
multipliers associated with (4) and (5) respectively. The rst order conditions are:
R;t =
1
(1 +  ct)
 
cR;t+1 + gct+1
 (18)
2
1  eR;t   lR;t =  R;txRBR (eR;t)
 1
h
(eR;t)
  geR;t1 ixR 1 (19)
2
1  eR;t   lR;t = R;t(1  
l
t)wR;thR;t (20)
1
(1 +  ct) (cR;t + g
c
t )
=


1  k +  1  kt+1 rt+1 
1 +  ct+1
  
cR;t+1 + gct+1
 (21)
1
(1 +  ct) (cR;t + g
c
t )
=

 
1 + rbt+1
 
1 +  ct+1
  
cR;t+1 + gct+1
 (22)
 R;t = R;t+1(1   lt+1)wR;t+1lR;t+1 +  R;t+1(1  h) (23)
A.2 Poor households
Each Poor household, P , maximizes its lifetime utility in any given period t by choosing cP;t,
eP;t, lP;t, hP;t+1 subject to the constraints (9) and (10) taking factor prices and policy as given.
Dening as P;t and  P;t the Lagrange multipliers associated with (9) and (10) respectively. The
rst order conditions are:
P;t =
1
(1 +  ct)
 
cP;t+1 + gct+1
 (24)
2
1  eP;t   lP;t =  P;txPBP  (eP;t)
 1
h
(eP;t)
  geP;t1 ixP 1 (25)
2
1  eP;t   lP;t = P;t(1  
l
t)wP;thP;t (26)
 P;t = P;t+1(1   lt+1)wP;t+1lP;t+1 +  P;t+1(1  h) (27)
A.3 Firms
Each rm f maximizes its prots (11) subject to its production function (12) by choosing kft ,
lfR;t, l
f
P;t. The rst order conditions are:
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 (1 m)
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

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
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
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+ (1  )
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vv 1
(1  )

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
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
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
+ (1 m)



kft
v
+ (1  )

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 1
(kgt )
1 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wP;t = Am

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 1 
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
lfP;t

+ (1 m)



kft
v
+ (1  )

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vv  1
(kgt )
1  (30)
Notice that each rm, f , makes extraordinary prots given by ft = (1  ) yft as in Guo and
Lansing (1997).
B Market clearing conditions
Market clearing conditions in the capital market, the dividends market, the labor (Rich-skilled
and Poor -unskilled) market, the government bonds market are respectively (in per capita terms):
nfkft = nRkR;t (31)
nfft = nRR;t (32)
nf lfR;t = nRlR;thR;t (33)
nf lfP;t = nP lP;thP;t (34)
bt  Bt
N
= nRbR;t (35)
The economys aggregate resource constraint in per capita terms is given by:
nR
h
cR;t + kR;t+1   (1  k)kR;t
i
+ nP cP;t + g
i
t + g
c
t + g
e
t = n
fyft (36)
where we express the number of Rich and Poor households in terms of their population share
shares nR  NRN , nP  NPN = 1  nR.
C Full equilibrium system
The full equilibrium system in per capita terms is given in detail by the following 39 equations
in 39 unknowns which are {yft ; cR;t; cP;t; iR;t; dR;t; kR;t+1; hR;t+1; hP;t+1; bR;t+1; eR;t; eP;t; lR;t;
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g
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t } given the initial condition for the state variables and the feedback
policy coe¢ cients:
R;t =
1
(1 + 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 (37)
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1  eR;t   lR;t =  R;txRBR (eR;t)
 1
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(eR;t)
  geR;t1 ixR 1 (38)
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1  eR;t   lR;t = R;t(1  
l
t)wR;thR;t (39)
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kR;t+1 = (1  k)kR;t + iR;t (42)
bR;t+1 = bR;t + dR;t (43)
 R;t = R;t+1(1   lt+1)wR;t+1lR;t+1 +  R;t+1(1  h) (44)
hR;t+1 = (1  h)hR;t +BR
h
(eR;t)
  geR;t1 ixR (45)
(1 +  ct) cR;t + iR;t + dR;t = (1  kt ) (rtkR;t + R;t) + (1   lt)wR;tlR;thR;t + trR;t + rbtbR;t (46)
P;t =
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 (47)
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(58)
R;t = (1  ) yft (59)
The scal feedback policy rules are:
sg
c
t   sg
c
= g
c
q (qt 1   q) (60)
sg
i
t   sg
i
= g
i
q (qt 1   q) (61)
strPt   strP = trPq (qt 1   q) (62)
strRt   strR = trRq (qt 1   q) (63)
sg
e
t   sg
e
= g
e
q (qt 1   q) (64)
 ct    c = cq (qt 1   q) (65)
 l    l = lq (qt 1   q) (66)
kt   k = kq (qt 1   q) (67)
where
qt 1  nRbR;t
nfyft 1
(68)
sg
i
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git
nfyft
(69)
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e
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get
nfyft
(70)
sg
c
t 
gct
nfyft
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nP trP;t
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39
strRt 
nRtrR;t
nfyft
(73)
geR;t  !get (74)
geP;t  (1  !)get (75)
D Allowing access to capital/nancial markets for Poor house-
holds
In this Appendix we relax the assumption that Poor households do not have access to cap-
ital/nancial markets. To do this, we allow both Rich and Poor households to accumulate
physical capital and borrow or save in government bonds. As is known, under perfect capital
markets and with common discount factors, the allocation of the aggregate stock of capital and
bonds to di¤erent types of individual investors cannot be pinned down by the equilibrium con-
ditions. To overcome this problem we assume that both types of households face intermediation
or transaction costs due to imperfections in capital and nancial markets as in e.g. Benigno
(2009), Angelopoulos et al. (2014) and Economides et al. (2014). Transaction costs guarantee
a well-dened long run solution and induce stationarity during the transition. In addition, they
allow us to maintain household heterogeneity in asset holdings (see below). Here we only present
the new equations and variables associated with the maximization problem of Poor households,
and any equations that have changed relative to the model in the main text.
Now, each Poor household, P; maximizes its expected discounted lifetime utility subject to
the following within period budget constraint which substitutes equation (9) in Section 2.4:
(1 +  ct) cP;t + iP;t + dP;t = (1  kt )rtkP;t + (1   lt)wP;tlP;thP;t + trP;t + rbtbP;t (76)
where iP;t is private investment in physical capital of Poor households, dP;t, is savings in the
form of government bonds of Poor households, kP;t; is the beginning of period physical capital
owned by Poor households and, bP;t; is the beginning of period government bonds owned by
Poor households. The laws of motion of physical capital and government bonds of each Poor
household are:
kP;t+1 = (1  k)kP;t + iP;t   P
2

kP;t
nfyt
2
(77)
bP;t+1 = bP;t + dP;t   P
2

bP;t
nfyt
2
(78)
the quadratic terms as in e.g. Benigno (2009), P2

kP;t
nfyt
2
and P2

bP;t
nfyt
2
; capture transac-
tion costs while the parameters P ; P  0 measure the size of these transactions costs. Poor
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households choose kP ; bP which yield two new rst order conditions:
1
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1
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 (80)
Similarly, the problem of Rich households is modied as follows. Rich household face similar
quadratic transactions costs and thus the laws of motion of physical capital and government
bonds for each Rich household changes from equations (6) and (7) to:
kR;t+1 = (1  k)kR;t + iR;t   R
2

kR;t
nfyt
2
(81)
bR;t+1 = bR;t + dR;t   R
2

bR;t
nfyt
2
(82)
where the quadratic terms R2

kR;t
nfyt
2
and R2

bR;t
nfyt
2
capture transaction costs and the para-
meter R; R  0 measure the size of these transactions costs.
The rst order conditions of Rich households with respect to kR; bR; change from equations
(19) and (21) in Appendix A.1 to:
1
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 (84)
For comparison with the benchmark economy, in the numerical solution of section 7.2 we
set R < P and R < P such that the total wealth of Rich households is higher than that
of Poor households. We report that our main results do not depend on the exact values of the
transaction costs parameters.
Finally, the resource constraint of the economy changes from equation (36) in Appendix C
to:
nR

cR;t + kR;t+1   (1  k)kR;t + R2

kR
nfyt
2
+ R2

bR
nfyt
2

+
nP

cP;t + kP;t+1   (1  k)kP;t + P2

kP
nfyt
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
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2
+ get + g
i
t + g
c
t = n
fyt
(85)
while the government budget constraint changes from equation (53) in Appendix C to :
41
(sg
c
t + s
ge
t + s
gi
t + s
trR
t + s
trP
t )n
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b
t )(nRbR;t + nP bP;t) = nRbR;t+1 + nP bP;t+1
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k
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(86)
The new market clearing conditions for physical capital and bonds are nfkft = nRkR;t+nPkP;t
and bt = nRbR;t + nP bP;t which substitute equations (31) and (35) in Appendix B respectively.
To sum up, in the DCE system presented in Appendix C we add four new endogenous
variables, kP;t; dP;t; bP;t and iP;t and four new equations (77), (78), (79) and (80). In addition,
the equations (81), (82), (83), (84), (85), (86) substitute equations (42), (43), (40), (41), (52),
(53) respectively.
E Tables and Figures
Table E.1: Steady state labor and capital incomes
(as % deviations from status quo)
Fiscal
Instr.
wRlRhR wP lPhP rkR r
bbR
sg
c
0.0071 0.0039 0.0076 -0.3449
sg
i
0.0134 0.0088 0.0122 -0.3394
strP 0.0012 -0.0041 0.0020 -0.3509
sg
e
0.0281 0.0232 0.0289 -0.3240
 c 0.0081 0.0050 0.0086 -0.3439
 l 0.0159 0.0138 0.0162 -0.3360
k 0.0238 0.0108 0.0116 -0.3343
Figure E.1: Dynamic path of other endogenous variables under the optimized scal policy
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